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1. Abstract (English) 
This working paper has a threefold purpose: first, it proposes a better understanding 
of the difference between the Internet (interconnecting computers) and the World 
Wide Web (managing information). Against this background, a four-layer model of 
cyberspace is presented including a physical, logical, informational, and social layer. 
Second, the paper splits the national cybersecurity debate in five distinct subject are-
as, or mandates. These include Military Cyberactivities, Counter-Cybercrime, Intelli-
gence and Counter-Intelligence, Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis 
Management, and Cyberdiplomacy and Internet Governance, each of which is typi-
cally covered by a distinct government department. Third, as one of the most under-
stated and least understood mandates on this list, Internet Governance is described 
at more length in the final section. 
 
2. Abstract (Deutsch) 
Die Zielsetzung dieses Arbeitspapiers gliedert sich in drei Kernpunkte: Erstens wird 
versucht, den Unterschied zwischen dem Internet (Vernetzung von Computern) und 
dem World Wide Web (Informationsverwaltung) herauszuarbeiten. Vor diesem Hin-
tergrund soll der Cyberspace als ein Vierschichtenmodell aufgespannt werden, das 
eine physische, logische, informationelle und soziale Schicht beinhaltet. Zweitens teilt 
dieses Papier die nationale Debatte zur Cybersicherheit in fünf unterschiedliche 
Themenbereiche, oder auch Mandate. Diese umfassen Militärische Cyberaktivitäten; 
Bekämpfung von Cyberkriminalität; Nachrichtendienstliche Aktivitäten; Schutz Kriti-
scher Infrastrukturen und Nationales Krisenmanagement; sowie Cyberdiplomatie und 
Internet Governance. Im Allgemeinen kann jedes dieser fünf Mandate von unter-
schiedlichen Ministerien abgedeckt werden. Drittens soll in einem abschließenden 
Teil Internet Governance, als eines der am wenigsten beachteten Mandate in diesem 
Zusammenhang, ausführlicher betrachtet werden. 
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3. Grasping the Difference 
Cyberspace is the “world behind your screen.”1 However, when computers started 
talking to each other, this world started to expand. Historically, this process had al-
ready begun in 1969, when the Universities of California (UCLA) and Stanford 
(SRI)—the first two nodes of what would later come to be known as the Internet, or 
the Net—exchanged their first host-to-host message.2 
 
3.1. The Net 
The Internet has played a crucial role for the expansion of cyberspace. By using a 
combination of different data transmission mechanisms, such as the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) as the two most important pro-
tocols within the Internet Protocol Suite, an increasing number of computer users 
have been empowered by receiving unprecedented access to information. 
Although the Internet is the most recent technology in a long series of communication 
technologies (such as telephone, teleprinters, or the radio), today internet technology 
is nearly all-encompassing. This is especially due to the fact that Information and 
Telecommunications Technology (ICT) is increasingly being dominated by the Inter-
net Protocol (IP) as the main technical standard for communication between devic-
es.3 This can be attributed in a large part to bottom-up non-governmental stakehold-
ers, such as the members of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), who have 
developed many key software protocols and technical fixes that the Internet depends 
upon today.4 This is why the development of internet standards can best be de-
scribed as a self-regulatory process.5 
                                                          
1
 John Naughton, A Brief History of the Future. The Origins of the Internet  (London: Phoenix, 1999). 
311. 
2
 See, for instance, Barry M. Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet,” ISOC, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief-history-internet. 
3
 Jovan Kurbalija, An Introduction to Internet Governance, (Genève: DiploFoundation, 2010), 
http://archive1.diplomacy.edu/poolbin.asp?IDPool=1060. 6. 
4
 See, for instance, Paulina Borsook, “How Anarchy Works: On location with the masters of the 
metaverse, the Internet Engineering Task Force,” Wired, October 1995. 
5
 OECD, “Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies. Internet 
Infrastructure Indicators (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(98)7/FINAL),” (Paris 1998). 
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Measured by regular surveys,6 the number of global Internet users (defined as per-
sons who have available access to an Internet connection point,7 and the basic 
knowledge required to use web technology8) grew from 16 million in 1995 to more 
than 2.1 billion in 2011.9 This is an astounding increase of around 13,000%. Howev-
er, one should keep in mind that in 2011 more than ¾ of the world’s Internet users 
came from Asia (44%), Europe (22.7%), and North America (13%).10 
In general, an internetwork, or simply internet (with a lowercase “i”), evolves from in-
terconnecting computer networks. These generic networks of networks can vary in 
size. The interconnection of two Local Area Networks (LANs), for instance, forms a 
smaller internet than two interconnected Wide Area Networks (WANs).11 The Internet 
(with an uppercase “I”), however, is the unique “global network of computer net-
works.”12  
Internet capitalization conventions should not be overlooked in political discourse. For 
instance, when in 2006 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) changed its 
policy in officially spelling out “internet” (with a lowercase “i”), US ambassador David 
A. Clark reacted disconcertedly, not knowing whether this would be of any concern 
for US interests.13 In contrast, The Economist changed its editorial policy in 2003, 
arguing that the “internet” was no longer one particular network but has transformed 
to a generic technology comparable to the telephone or the radio.14 
The Internet is essentially a collection of networks, and devices on these networks, 
which agree to communicate with each other. This communication depends on the 
                                                          
6
 See, for instance, UNSTATS, “UN Millennium Development Goals Indicators. The official United 
Nations site for the MDG Indicators,”  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=0&SeriesId=608. 
7
 Internet connection points are usually provided by Internet service providers (ISPs) against payment. 
8
 See Internet World Stats, “Surfing and Site Guide,”  http://www.internetworldstats.com/surfing.htm#1. 
9
 See Internet World Stats, “Internet Growth Statistics,”  
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm. 
10
 See Internet World Stats, “Internet Users in the World. Distribution by World Region,”  
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm; NewScientist, “Exploring the exploding Internet,”  
http://www.newscientist.com/gallery/mg20227061900-exploring-the-exploding-internet/5. 
11
 A LAN usually connects computers and devices within relatively limited areas (such as office build-
ings, universities or power plants), while a WAN covers a broader terrain (such as a city, region or 
even a state). Today, for instance, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) in-
creasingly monitor and control industrial production or infrastructure over IP-based LAN-WAN connec-
tions. 
12
 Naughton, A Brief History of the Future. The Origins of the Internet: 314. 
13
 Victoria Shannon, “What’s in an ‘i’? Internet governance,” New York Times, 3 December 2006. 
14
 See Kurbalija, An Introduction to Internet Governance. 6. 
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so-called Internet Protocol (IP).15 Internet protocol numbers represent the most basic 
identifier on the Internet, which is why they are also referred to as an IP address. 
Every device connected to the Internet has its own IP address; if it does not have an 
IP address, it is not connected to the Internet. 
An IP address is a complex string of values used to identify the physical location of a 
computer connected to the Internet (e.g., PCs, servers, smartphones). In the early 
1980s, a total number of 4.3 billion (4.3x10^9) IP addresses (referred to as IPv4)16 
were considered to be enough for the foreseeable future.17 However, the explosive 
demand for IP address blocks over the last thirty years, as well as the vision of an 
Internet of Things (IoT), in which everyday objects (such as home appliances or 
clothing) are made accessible over the Internet, have proven the original quantity of 
IP addresses allotted was, in fact, inadequate. 
In the 1990s, therefore, IP version 6 (referred to as IPv6)18 was developed. IPv6 
would provide enough address space for around 340 undecillion (a trillion, trillion, 
trillion, or 3.4x10^38) Internet connection points. With an estimated world population 
of 6.8 billion living human beings,19 the potential number of IPv6 addresses would 
enable each individual to connect around 1.2 billion devices to the Net; or, to eluci-
date these numbers in a more comprehensible analogy, “if all the IPv4 addresses 
could fit within a Blackberry, it would take something the size of Earth to contain 
IPv6.”20 
IPv4 reached its “depletion date” in the spring-summer of 2011,21 which made the 
shift to IPv6 a necessity. With IP addresses, not a restricted commodity anymore, this 
                                                          
15
 Sometimes also written as TCP/IP. 
16
 For a better overview, IPv4 addresses are usually not displayed in a long line of zeros and ones, but 
in four groups of decimal numbers, separated by dots and ranging from 0 to 255 (e.g., 208.80.152.2). 
17
 See, for instance, ICANN, “To 4,294,967,296 and Beyond – Under 10% of IPv4 Space Remains: 
Adoption of IPv6 Is Essential,”  http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-29jan10-
en.htm. 
18
 Similar to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses are usually not written in long lines of zeros and ones, 
but in eight groups of four-digit, case insensitive hexadecimal values (0-9 and A-F/a-f), separated by 
colons (e.g., 21DA:00D3:0000:2F3B:02AA:00FF:FE28:9C5A). 
19
 World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2011,”  
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2.  
20
 ICANN, “IPv6 Factsheet,”  http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-26oct07.htm. 3. 
21
 There are different dates depending on what regions of the world “exhausted” their stock of IPv4 
addresses. Indeed, the United States government is said to hold a very large amount of unassigned 
IPv4 addresses “in reserve”, so in some cases it can be said there has not yet been a true exhaustion 
of all IPv4 addresses. 
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will allow the true IoT to occur, meaning literally all of human possessions (now, and 
for the foreseeable future) could potentially be “tagged” and made accessible over 
the Internet. The new Internet is therefore just beginning. 
 
3.2. The Web 
As one of the most important applications on the Net, the World Wide Web played a 
crucial role in the expansion of cyberspace. It was developed between 1989 and 
1990 by British software engineer Tim Berners-Lee while working at the European 
Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN). What initially started as a project to aid CERN 
physicists navigate a wealth of information was eventually released to the wider pub-
lic in 1991.22 However, the Web only had its breakthrough in 1993, when Mosaic—
the first major graphics supporting browser—entered the market.23 
In order to guarantee both a uniform language in which information could be present-
ed on websites, and a functioning device by which this information could be trans-
ferred and identified safely, Berners-Lee had to invent the Hypertext Markup Lan-
guage (HTML), as well as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and the Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL). Today, the standards for the Web are developed by a non-
governmental World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) established in 1994. 
In August 2011, there were more than 463 million websites (including subpages) with 
domain names and content on the Net.24 Compared to just 18,000 in August 1995,25 
this is a total increase of more than 2.5 million percent over the last 16 years. How-
ever, a significant share of this increase was only generated over the last two 
years.26 
As regards web server software, since May 1996, the open-source Apache HTTP 
Server software, developed by an open community under the auspices of the non-
profit Apache Software Foundation, has been the most popular HTTP server software 
                                                          
22
 CERN, “The website of the world’s first-ever web server,”  http://info.cern.ch/. 
23
 W3C, “A Little History of the World Wide Web. From 1945-1995,”  http://www.w3.org/History.html. 
24
 Netcraft, “August 2011 Web Server Survey,”  http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2011/08/05/august-
2011-web-server-survey-3.html.   
25
 Marsha Walton, “Web reaches new milestone: 100 million sites,” CNN.com, 1 November 2006. 
26
 Netcraft, “August 2011 Web Server Survey”.   
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in use. As of August 2011 Apache was estimated to serve 65.18% of all websites, 
followed by Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) with 15.86%, the Russian 
nginx with 7.67%, and Google Web Server with 3.68%.27 
The Web and the Net have always been inseparable. This often leads to the miscon-
ception that these two terms can be used interchangeably. However, the Web is just 
one of many different applications “on” the Net. The Net’s structure can be visualized 
by looking at the layered network architecture model called the Internet Protocol 
Suite.28 Here, for instance, the Internet Protocol (IP) lies on the Internet Layer, the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) on the overlying Transport Layer, and the Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) on the top, which is called Application Layer. A 
similar organization can be observed in the Open Systems Interconnection Model 
(also referred to as the OSI model).29 All this means Web services can only be used 
properly if the underlying services (e.g., TCP/IP) work correctly. 
In this context, the Net’s overall idea is to interconnect computers in a global network 
of computer networks, while, building upon this interconnection, the Web’s essential 
aim is to manage information in a global Web of human-readable documents that can 
be defined as “content supplied in response to a request.”30 
This emphasize on content (or information) becomes obvious when looking at differ-
ent definitions for the Web. For instance, on the world’s first-ever website Berners-
Lee characterized the Web as “a wide-area hypermedia information retrieval initiative 
aiming to give universal access to a large universe of documents.”31 Elsewhere, the 
Web was also referred to as a “hypermedia system linking text, graphics, sound and 
video on computers distributed all over the world.”32 
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. 
28
 IETF RFC 1122, “Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication Layers,” October 1989, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122. 
29
 ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference 
Model: The Basic Model.” 
30
 W3C, “W3C Glossary/Dictionary,”  http://www.w3.org/2003/glossary/alpha/D/80. 
31
 W3C, “World Wide Web,”  http://www.w3.org/History/19921103-
hypertext/hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html. 
32
 Naughton, A Brief History of the Future. The Origins of the Internet: 319. 
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3.3. Cyberspace—A Four Layer Model 
In the introduction to this section, cyberspace has been referred to as the world be-
hind your screen. However, since the 1960s, this world’s horizons have expanded 
considerably. This is due, in no small part, to internet technologies developed by a 
self-regulated, non-governmental community. 
While differentiating the Internet (interconnecting computers) from the World Wide 
Web (managing information), the aim of the previous two subsections was to provide 
a better understanding of their contribution to the expansion of cyberspace. The aim 
of this section, however, is to define cyberspace as a somewhat wider framework, in 
which the Net plays an essential, albeit not exclusive, role. 
Over the last years, the term cyberspace has gained considerable attention. Science 
fiction author William Gibson is credited with first mentioning it in his short story Burn-
ing Chrome (1982).33 Two years later, in his famous 1984 cyberpunk novel called 
Neuromancer, the author described Cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination.”34 
Years later Gibson labeled the term an “effective buzzword” that seemed “evocative 
and essentially meaningless” when it first emerged on his pages.35 However, today 
cyberspace is not only popular among different strands of cyberpunks or computer 
enthusiasts. Moreover, it has made its way into a variety of disciplines of which politi-
cal science is just one. 
In contrast to land, sea, air and space, cyberspace is a human construct with compo-
nents that can change over time. Today, a wide variety of distinct definitions of cy-
berspace have been proposed.36 One of which was first used in the aftermath of 
9/11, when the 2003 US National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace described cyber-
space as a national “nervous system” which controls the country’s critical infrastruc-
ture. While highlighting the role of public-private engagement, the strategy stated: 
                                                          
33
 William Gibson, “Burning Chrome [1982],” in Burning Chrome (New York: HarperCollins Publishers 
Inc., 2003). 
34
 William Gibson, Neuromancer  (New York: Ace Books, 2000 [1984]). 67. 
35
 Scott Thill, “March 17, 1948: William Gibson, Father of Cyberspace,” Wired, 17 March 2009. 
36
 For a first overview see Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” 
in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin Kramer et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense 
UP, 2009), 26-7. 
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“Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected com-
puters, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical 
infrastructures to work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essen-
tial to our economy and our national security.”37 
Five years later, in 2008, a similar definition was put forward in US President George 
W. Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive 54, also known as Homeland Se-
curity Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23).38 This document established 
the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI),39 a partially classified 
USD 17 billion program designed to protect Federal Government systems against 
intrusion attempts.40 In this context, the directive defines cyberspace as 
“the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and in-
cludes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. Common usage of 
the term also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions 
between people.”41 
Under the Obama administration, this definition has been adopted by the 2009 60-
Day Cyberspace Policy Review.42 
Nonetheless, there is still no standard, universally accepted definition for cyberspace, 
and for this reason, it is useful to think about ways how to approach the concept 
comprehensively. One way to do so is to conceptualize cyberspace in terms of multi-
ple interdependent layers of activities. There are varied conceptualizations of the dif-
ferent numbers and names of layers present in current academic discourse.43 How-
                                                          
37
 White House, “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” (Washington, DC: White House, 
2003). 
38
 National Security Presidential Directive 54: Cyber Security and Monitoring (NSPD-54) / Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 23: Cyber Security and Monitoring (HSPD-23). 
39
 White House, “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2008).  
40
 Victoria Samson, “The Murky Waters of the White House’s Cybersecurity Plan,” Center for Defense 
Information, 23 July 2008. 
41
 Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “Tech Topic 20: Cyber Security and 
Communications,” FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/techtopics/techtopics20.html. 
 
42
 White House, “Cyberspace Policy Review. Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communications Infrastructure,” (Washington, DC: White House, 2009). 
43
 See, for instance, Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace. National Security and Information 
Warfare  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 10.; and Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart 
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ever, this paper argues in favor of the following four-layer model of cyberspace:44 
1. The physical layer contains all the hardware devices, which include routers, 
switches, storage media, satellites, sensors, and other technical conduits, both 
wired and wireless. The physical infrastructure can be located geographically 
in “real space” and is thus subject to different national jurisdictions. If it were 
removed, the overlying layers would disappear as well, as happened in 2011 
in Armenia, where reported 90% of all Internet services crashed due to a re-
tired 75-year-old woman who single-handedly sliced through an underground 
fiber optic cable with her spade.45 
2. The logical layer generally refers to the code, which includes both the soft-
ware and the protocols incorporated within that software.46 Generally speak-
ing, a protocol defines the rules or conventions necessary to obtain a certain 
goal (e.g., communication).  Formalizing a protocol makes it a standard. Soft-
ware, in contrast, is the computer program that implements these protocols. In 
this respect, protocols “are not considered to be satisfactory standards until in-
teroperable independent implementations [within different computer programs] 
have been demonstrated. (This is the embodiment of the “running code” slo-
gan.)”47 Networking protocols are commonly segmented by their function, and 
how close (or how far) away they work from the “end user”—the average com-
puter user. In the most common of segmentation, known as the OSI Model, 
basic everyday client-side applications (such as Windows Internet Explorer) 
operate at the top of the model (level 7), while the aforementioned TCP works 
on Level 4 (the Transport layer) and IP works on Level 3 (the Internet layer). 
Built upon the Web, for instance, more complex applications often combine 
certain aspects of services, which can be eventually combined and applied by 
other applications on even higher levels. This flexibility presents inexhaustible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
H. Starr, and Larry Wentz, eds., Cyber Power and National Security (Washington, DC: National 
Defence UP, 2009), Chapter 2. 
44
 See David Clark, “Characterizing cyberspace: past, present and future,” MIT/CSAIL Working Paper, 
12 March 2010. 
45
 Tom Parfitt, “Georgian woman cuts off web access to whole of Armenia,” The Guardian, 6 April 
2011. 
46
 See, for instance, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas. The Fate of the Commons in a Connected 
World, (New York: Random House, 2001), http://www.the-future-of-
ideas.com/download/lessig_FOI.pdf. 23.; and Lawrence Lessig, Code, (New York: Basic Books, 
2006), http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf.  
47
 IETF RFC 4677, “The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force,” 
September 2006, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4677. 
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possibilities to create new services, which, today, include search engines, 
Weblog, social networking sites, podcasts, Internet telephony, Web mapping, 
etc. Yet, this abundance of capabilities also has a dark side: malware. Essen-
tially, malware (also malicious logic) includes a variety of different Trojans, vi-
ruses and worms.48 Similar to “benign” services, more complex malware often 
combines certain aspects of existing logic (software code).49 In the past, one 
of the first major logic incidents occurred in 1982 when the CIA purportedly 
corrupted the software of a Soviet gas pipeline computer control system which 
was said to result in “the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ev-
er seen from space.”50 Other threats include attacks on the basic infrastructure 
of the Net itself, for instance the Domain Name System (DNS). In April 2010, 
for example, a Chinese ISP introduced the wrong information into their routing 
tables. This caused around 10% of the Internet traffic (theoretically) routed to 
be mapped through China.51 DNS spoofing is usually conducted by intentional-
ly corrupting the information in the Internet routing tables, so that users, who 
are passed from one router to the other, have to traverse a certain target net-
work. Potential consequences could have been dire, as, for instance, all 
webpages (e.g. for a bank or webmail service) could have been successfully 
faked and therefore all login details could have been compromised. However, 
this very case was reported to be “probably unintentional.”52 
3. The content layer describes all the information created, captured, stored and 
processed within cyberspace. Information is defined as “knowledge concern-
ing objects, such as facts, events, things, processes, or ideas”.53 It contains all 
human-readable messages delivered by social media Websites or email; con-
tent of articles and books kept on memory sticks and virtual databases; news 
broadcasted via blogs and Websites; and music, movies and pictures con-
sumed online. However, access to information can also be systematically lim-
                                                          
48
 Vangie Beal, “The Difference Between a Computer Virus, Worm and Trojan Horse,” Webopedia, 29 
June 2011. 
49
 Alexander Klimburg and Heli Tirmaa-Klaar, Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions 
and Capabilities for Cooperation for Action within the EU, (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011), 
http://www.oiip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/EP_Study_FINAL.pdf. 48.  
50
 Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War  (New York: Random House 
Publishing Group, 2004). 269. 
51
 The difference here is between theoretical and actual route propogation – in fact while 10% of the 
Internet traffic could have gone through China, only a small fraction of it actually did. 
52
 See Robert McMillan, “A Chinese ISP Momentarily Hijacks the Internet,” PCWorld, 8 April 2010. 
53
 ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993, “Information technology – Vocabulary – Part 1: Fundamental terms.” 
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ited. Blocking or removing online content from the Web happens for reasons 
such as protecting intellectual property rights, securing national order or social 
identity. In fact, in recent years, online censorship and content restrictions 
have risen rapidly as demonstrated by the OpenNet Initiative.54 Moreover, in-
formation may take a more abstract form; if computers, for instance, direct 
connected printers on how to print a certain document, it is done by using 
printer control strings. These can be considered to be informational in form but 
logical in purpose.55 The content layer is the focus of the very wide-ranging da-
ta protection debate and encompasses issues such as to what extent even 
“anonymous” information can be extracted from analyzing user behavior. This 
contextual setting is also why the content layer is sometimes referred to as a 
semantic layer. 
4. The social layer is made up of all the people using and shaping the character 
of cyberspace. It is the actual Internet of people and potential relationships, ra-
ther than the implied Internet of hardware and software. Essentially, the social 
layer includes governments as well as private sector, civil society and tech-
nical community actors. However, all share a specific characteristic: while in 
“real” life (extra cyberspace) people can ultimately be identified by their unique 
DNA code, attribution is much more difficult on the Net (intra cyberspace). In 
contrast to the “meat” world, individuals in cyberspace facilitates establishment 
of multiple identities for the user. And alternatively, one single virtual identity 
can have multiple human users (e.g., the same NYT online office account be-
ing used by different employees). This has not only important implications in 
terms of security or copyright protection but also raises interesting questions 
about how the cyber world plays into the real world. In reference to last year’s 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, it has been argued that the ex-
change via Facebook played an important role in giving birth to “a pan-Arab 
youth movement dedicated to spreading democracy in a region without it.”56 
The protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria have even been 
characterized as a “’global political awaking’—a movement for change that is 
                                                          
54
 See http://opennet.net/.  
55
 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrance and Cyberwar  (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009). 12. 
56
 David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History,” New 
York Times, 13 February 2011. 
Alexander Klimburg and Philipp Mirtl 
WP 65: Cyberspace and Governance—A Primer 
14 
enabled and accelerated by modern technology’.”57 
This way of thinking about cyberspace does not deliver a single best definition. Ra-
ther, it tries to make the concept more accessible. In fact, for a comprehensive un-
derstanding, all four layers must be considered equally. Cyberthreats, for instance, 
might arise at the physical layer (destruction of wires) as well as on the logical (mali-
cious software), informational (compromising information), or social layer (corrupting 
people). In the end, however, all cyberattacks ultimately seek to influence the “social 
layer”. 
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4. The Five Mandates of National Cybersecurity 
Within the general context of discussing “national cybersecurity,” it is very important 
to keep in mind that this is not one single subject area; rather, it is possible to split the 
issue of national cybersecurity into five distinct perspectives or “mandates”, each of 
them usually covered by different government departments, and this is not an ideal 
state. Unfortunately, there is frequently a significant lack of coordination between 
these organisations, and this lack of coordination is perhaps one of the most serious 
organisational challenges within the domain of national cybersecurity.  
Furthermore, overlap between themes and ambiguity is the rule, not the exception, in 
cybersecurity. The physical reality of national cybersecurity is that all these topics are 
largely overlapping. However, the bureaucratic reality, as lived in nearly all national 
governments, is that these subject areas are kept separate from each other in distinct 
“mandates”. Each mandate has developed its own emphasis and even its own lexi-
con, despite the fact that they are all simply different facets of the same problem. 
1. Military Cyberactivities: The term “cyberwar” is being used in a number of 
inappropriate or misleading contexts (for instance, when referring to cyber-
espionage). Therefore, it is true to say “cyberwarfare is a loaded term”.58 Con-
sequently, this mandate has been entitled “military cyberactivities” and en-
compasses a range of actions (both offensive and defensive) sometimes also 
covered by non-military organisations (such as the intelligence community). 
From an academic point of view, however, the term “cyberwar” is useful to dis-
tinguish it from all other cyberattacks, in particular ones using sophisticated 
cyberweapons.59 The Internet security company McAfee has warned since 
2007 that, in its opinion, a “virtual arms race” is occurring in cyberspace with a 
number of countries deploying cyberweapons.60 Many governments are build-
ing capabilities to wage cyberwar,61 while some NATO reports have claimed 
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that up to 120 countries are developing a military cybercapability.62 These ca-
pabilities can be interpreted as simply one more tool of warfare, similar to air-
power, which would be used only within a clearly defined tactical military mis-
sion (for instance, for shutting down an air-defence system). This is called 
here “battlefield cyberwarfare,” and the effects are limited to the operational-
tactical environment. Alternatively, the emphasis can lie on “strategic 
cyberwarfare”—the ability to strike at the heart of an (advanced) nation by un-
dermining its economy and its basic ability to function. There is no legal defini-
tion of cyberwar, although since 2010 there has been an increasing interna-
tional understanding on two key issues regarding cyberwar: first, that the Laws 
of Armed Conflict apply also in cyberspace and, second, that a “cyberwar at-
tack” is said to have occurred if “the level of damage is approximate to a phys-
ical attack.”63 Military Cyberactivities, therefore, encompass three different 
mandates: enabling Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities, Battlefield 
Cyberwarfare, and Strategic Cyberwarfare.  
2. Counter-Cybercrime: Cybercrime is increasingly considered the most ad-
vanced and profitable of all criminal enterprises. Estimates of the cost of cy-
bercrime to business range as high as 1 trillion dollars for 2009,64 and by some 
estimates it has long since overtaken the drug trade in terms of business vol-
ume.65 Cybercrime activities can include a wide swath of activities that impact 
both the individual citizen directly (e.g., identity theft) and corporations (e.g., 
the theft of intellectual property). At least as significant for national security, 
however, is the logistical support capability cybercrime can offer to anyone in-
terested in conducting cyberattacks. This includes hosting services, the sale of 
stolen identities and credit card numbers, money-laundering services,66 and 
even the provision of entire hacking tools and attack-kits to enable large-scale 
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cyber-campaigns.67 There are convincing indications that Russian cybercrime 
syndicates played a role in the cyberattacks on Georgia and Estonia,68 to 
name but two examples. This is also where cybercrime interacts not only with 
military cyberactivities, but also with cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is a highly 
contentious term. There is a prevalent concern the term could be used to se-
verely criminalize not only “minor acts of cybercrime” (often called hacktivisim), 
but also any type of online expression critical of a government. These con-
cerns are largely overplayed, as there is a relatively clear acceptance that the 
difference between all forms of “crime” is the effect—a minor nuisance is cer-
tainly not an act of terrorism. Cyberterrorism is considered to be an act of ter-
rorism solely carried out with “cyber” means and the destruction from which 
rises to the level of a conventional terrorist attack. As of 2012, there has not 
been anything approaching the classification of a “cyberterrorist” attack, de-
spite, for instance, threats by the hacker group Anonymous to “bring down the 
Internet.”69 This said, there have been a rising number of criminal acts, includ-
ing attempts at mass disruption of communications, and this suggests cyber-
terrorism will be an issue for the future.  
3. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence: Distinguishing cyberespionage from 
cybercrime and military cyberactivities is not uncontroversial. In fact, they all 
depend on similar vectors of attack and similar technology. In practice, how-
ever, serious espionage cases (both regarding intellectual property as well as 
government secrets) are a class of their own, while at the same time it can be 
very difficult to ascertain for sure if the perpetrator is a nation-state or a crimi-
nal-group operating on behalf of a nation-state, or indeed operating on its own. 
Whoever is actually behind the attack, cyberespionage probably represents 
the most damaging part of cybercrime (if included in the category). Lost intel-
lectual property, for instance, was said to have cost the British economy in 
2011 UKP 9.2 billion a year.70 Cyberespionage, when directed toward states, 
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also makes it necessary to develop specific foreign policy response mecha-
nisms capable of dealing with the inherent ambiguity of actor-nature in cyber-
space. At the same time, counter-intelligence activities (i.e., detecting and 
combating the most sophisticated cyberintrusions) very often will depend upon 
other types of intelligence activity, including offensive intelligence collection 
but also extensive information sharing between international partners.  
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management: Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has become the catch-all term that seeks to in-
volve the providers of essential services of a country within a national security 
framework. As most of the service providers (such as public utilities, finance, 
or telecommunications) are in the private sector, it is necessary to extend 
some sort of government support to help protect them and the essential ser-
vices they provide from modern threats. While the original focus of these pro-
grams was often terrorism, today the majority of all CIP activity is directly con-
nected to cyber—usually cybercrime and cyberespionage. In this context, Na-
tional Crisis Management must be extended by an additional cyber compo-
nent. This includes institutional structures which enhance the cooperation be-
tween state and non-state actors both nationally and internationally, as well as 
a stable crisis communication network and an applicable legal framework to 
exchange relevant information.71 
5. Cyberdiplomacy and Internet Governance: Claiming that the “pursuit of 
classical diplomacy will no longer suffice,” in 2002 Evan H. Potter suggested 
that cyberdiplomacy was about “how diplomacy is adapting to the new global 
information order.”72 Taking the information revolution as point of departure, 
Potter claimed that information technology was the “primary mover”73 behind 
this change. However, more recent accounts dealing with the impact of infor-
mation technology on the overall conduct of diplomacy seem to avoid any ref-
erence to the term cyberdiplomacy.74 Interestingly, in a 2010 paper cyber-
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diplomacy has even been alternatively defined as being “about managing a 
world that is not just borderless but can function best when connectivity is al-
most seamless.”75 The paper was prepared in response to bilateral efforts be-
tween the US and Russia in fostering their cooperation on cybersecurity in 
2009. Conveniently, this definition also applies to multilateral efforts to pro-
mote norms and standards for cyber behavior in fora such as the United Na-
tions, or processes intended to establish “cyber confidence building measures” 
similar to those which have been initiated by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2012. In this context, cyberdiplomacy be-
comes similar to other diplomatic efforts on topics such as arms control and 
counter-proliferation. Internet Governance, in contrast, is largely a multi-
stakeholder activity, and probably the most international of all mandates. It is 
generally referred to as the process by which a number of state and non-state 
actors interact to manage what, in effect, is the logical layer of cyberspace. As 
one of the most understated and least understood aspects of national cyber-
security, it is described at more length below. Internet Governance, in contrast, 
is largely a multi-stakeholder activity, and is probably the most international of 
all mandates. 
As said in the introduction to this chapter, the reality of these different mandates is 
that they are each dealt with by different organizational groups not only within gov-
ernment, but also within the non-state sector. This is not a positive development. 
Normatively speaking, all of these mandates need to be holistically engaged, with 
overall coordination, if one is to develop a comprehensive national cybersecurity per-
spective. However, developing this “comprehensive” view is often a luxury most prac-
titioners of cybersecurity can simply not afford due to resource restraints. The reality 
is each of these mandates has developed its own specialized terms, priorities, and 
even basic principles and it is unusual to interact with more than one other mandate. 
The “silofication” of national cybersecurity is, therefore, not a challenge for govern-
ment departments, but indeed overall for the field as a whole. 
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5. Cybersecurity in Internet Governance 
Cyberspace only exists within parameters constructed and regulated by human be-
ings. These parameters have, until now, not been created directly by governments, 
but have rather arisen from the “bottom-up” in a process that is often referred to as 
the self-regulation of the Internet.76 The process is often transcribed as “Internet gov-
ernance”, which has been defined as “the development and application by Govern-
ments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared princi-
ples, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet.”77 
The Internet is a relatively new environment for human activities, and it was created 
with other purposes in mind than that for which it is now used. The basic Internet was 
never intended to be “secure”; security was always more of an afterthought than an 
original design feature.78 In essence, the DNA of the Internet was to be a “trusting, 
open” system. It did not appear feasible twenty years ago that not only would critical 
infrastructures partially come to depend on the Internet, but the Internet itself would 
be, at least in part, considered critical for everyday societal needs. 
The debate related to Internet governance issues dates at least back to the early 
1990s, when the Harvard Information Infrastructure Project (HIIP)79 brought together 
experts from government, industry, and academia to elaborate on emerging policy 
issues related to the development, use and growth of the global information infra-
structure (most notably the Internet).80 The HIIP was intended to serve as an inter-
disciplinary forum for economists, lawyers, political scientists and technologists, and 
culminated in a series of different publications. Their basic assumption was that the 
Internet had an unprecedented impact on our existing world order. As HIIP key re-
searcher Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson put it: 
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“Our experience of geographic space has been transformed by the information 
revolution, as it was by the railroad and air travel. But the transformation now 
underway on the Internet is not only greater and qualitatively different. It has 
collapsed the world, transcending and blurring political boundaries in the pro-
cess. It gives individuals instant, affordable access to other individuals, wher-
ever they may be, and it enables each to publish to the world.”81 
However, transcending national borders does not simultaneously imply the dissolu-
tion of the state. With physical power over people and infrastructure, states will re-
main important actors. What is clearly changing is the way this power is exercised. In 
an environment where the (trans-border) interaction between people can hardly be 
confined to the sole jurisdiction of a single state-actor, overlapping responsibilities will 
make it necessary for governments to collaborate with the private sector and with civil 
society actors.82 
In the course of the 1990s, the rather academic debates over Internet governance 
reached a broader public. When it became clear that the global DNS was not only a 
single point of technical failure, but also a single point for policy decisions about sur-
veillance and control of access to cyberspace, questions about the difference be-
tween technical management on the one hand, and regulatory control on the other 
were posed. For instance, was the decision to enter a TLD into the root zone file a 
mere technical issue or is it a public policy issue? For Milton Mueller, “[t]he uncom-
fortable fact is that the two meanings of ‘Internet governance’ are inseparably 
linked.”83 
Increasingly, state actors became aware they did not really understand the concrete 
subject matter of Internet governance. Therefore, in the final document to the 2003 
United Nation’s (UN) World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS-I), “the repre-
sentatives of the peoples of the world”84 called for setting up a collaborative Working 
Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). The WGIG should be composed of states as 
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well as the private sector and civil society actors. It had the aim to “investigate and 
make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of [the] Internet by 
2005.”85 After four meetings and with full and active participation of multiple stake-
holders, including governments (44%), the private sector (28%) and non-
governmental actors (28%) from both developing (59%) and developed countries 
(41%)86—the WGIG delivered a report87 (and an accompanying background report88) 
which served as input for the 2005 WSIS in Tunis (WSIS-II).89 The main recommen-
dation of the WGIG was the creation of a forum which 
“could address [. . .] issues, that are cross-cutting and multidimensional and 
that either affect more than one institution, are not dealt with by any institution, 
or are not addressed in a coordinated manner.”90 
This recommendation fundamentally inspired WSIS-II and led to the creation of a 
multi-stakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which should “identify emerging 
issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and, 
where appropriate, make recommendations.”91 
However, WGIG did not only recommend the creation of an Internet-related forum, 
but also provided a working definition of Internet governance eventually adopted by 
WSIS-II. By clearly reflecting the multi-stakeholder nature behind WGIG and the IGF 
the definition reads as follows: 
“Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet.”92 
This definition is intentionally broad in scope and touches upon a myriad of different 
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issue areas93 and actors. This is also why, in Internet governance, one cannot speak 
of one single Internet governance regime, but of multiple regimes (including the DNS 
regime, intellectual property regime, etc.).94 The key issue here is that these regimes 
are of highly diverse and sometimes contradicting nature—the interests of human 
rights and intellectual property, for instance, are not always aligned—but also need to 
be set in both policy and technical contexts. Both these larger contexts are them-
selves largely in flux, depending on current political affairs or the state of the techno-
logical evolution. 
Internet governance can therefore be considered not only a young, highly dynamic 
but also an essentially reactive policy field that seeks to reconcile the technical and 
policy heritage of the Internet with its ever-growing modern-day importance. Govern-
ments as a whole have been relative latecomers to Internet governance, despite its 
obvious political importance. The EU has considerable potential to play a formative 
role in evolving Internet governance, and help promote the development of a more 
secure Internet. 
 
5.1. Technical Internet Governance: Ad Hoc 
Internet governance can be subdivided into two domains: the technical domain and 
the policy domain. The technical domain predominantly consists of volunteers and 
civil society, and it can be described as completely “ad hoc”. One of the most im-
portant organizations is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has, since 
1986, developed many of the key software protocols and technical fixes the Internet 
depends upon today. The IETF is famously anarchic, not having any official laws, 
membership criteria or indeed much more than a basic organization. The members of 
the IETF “reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and 
running code.”95 Normally meeting three times a year, the 300 to 1,300 software en-
gineers do not vote on proposals; instead, they hum. Whichever group is perceived to 
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have “hummed louder” carries the (non) vote.96 Other groups, such as the Institute 
for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), are more organized, but work in a 
similar “bottom-up” approach with absolutely minimal governmental influence. The 
IEEE has over 350,000 members and addresses issues regarding connectivity (such 
as Bluetooth, Wireless and broadband). Groups such as the IETF and the IEEE can 
justifiably claim to have built the Internet, one protocol at a time. Governments have 
mostly played only a supportive role in this process. 
 
5.2. Policy Internet Governance: Institutionalized 
The policy domain of Internet governance is considerably more organized. ICANN, 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is the one organization 
that comes closest to having an assigning, coordinating or regulating function (and 
especially a policy function) on the Internet. ICANN is a “nonprofit public-benefit cor-
poration,” according to the laws of the US State of California, and is based at the 
University of Southern California. Its purpose is to “coordinate, at the overall level, the 
global Internet's systems of unique identifiers.”97 Founded in 1998 on the basis of 
preexisting technical organizations, ICANN was the direct result of President Clin-
ton’s promise to move the Internet out of the government structures98 and to open it 
to the public and to private commerce. Under a contract with the US Department of 
Commerce, ICANN was to “manage Internet names and addresses,” a relatively in-
nocuous-sounding mission encompassing three of the most vital functions of the In-
ternet: first, the allocation of Internet Protocol (IP) number resources for individual 
computers or machines, and directly corresponding to these, Domain Name Service 
(DNS) “names,” and the allocation of the so-called Top Level Domains (TLDs)99 to 
registries which  assign these identifiers to individual users and organizations across 
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the globe. Taken together, these three functions represent a considerable segment of 
Internet functionality. 
ICANN has grown with the Internet100—from a marginal budget in 1999 to USD 60 
million in 2010. Its nature has changed considerably as well. On the one hand, gov-
ernments have shown increasing interest in the formative work of ICANN, and the 
Government Advisory Council (GAC) has become especially active. While ICANN 
was “released” from US government control in October 2009, the US government still 
retains significant influence—more than other countries represented on the GAC. The 
increased interests of governments in ICANN, the rise in relative strength of national 
and generic registries, technical developments as well as the general “need for a 
mission” has meant ICANN has increasingly positioned itself as a security actor. This 
is especially evident in the rollout of DNSSEC (the new DNS protocol of the Internet), 
which is one of ICANN’s main functions. Furthermore, the increasing likelihood of 
attacks on the core infrastructure of the Internet (e.g., DNS and BGP Protocols) has 
made a case for the establishment of a global DNS-CERT, an idea that ICANN has 
been very interested in promoting. However, the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) has also showed considerable interest in assuming this role.  
The ITU has often sought to challenge ICANN’s position as the principal body in In-
ternet governance. As an UN-agency, it has played a key role in many of the UN ini-
tiatives in cyberspace, including helping to organize the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF) and the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) Process. The IGF has 
become an annual event for the global stakeholder community, where governments, 
private sector stakeholders and other interested groups present their views and pro-
posals for Internet-related issues. The ITU has mainly contributed to Internet govern-
ance within the technical domain. An ITU High Level Expert Group on Cybersecurity 
was established in 2007. It serves as a consultation forum for information security 
experts from different regions and produces reports on cybersecurity. It has also 
sought to promote its own dedicated cyber-centre, IMPACT, located in Malaysia. In 
2008, the controversial ITU-T Resolution 69101 on “Non-discriminatory access and 
use of the Internet resources” effectively called for an “internationalization” of the In-
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ternet and was principally backed by Arab states, Russia and China. Around the 
same time, ITU Secretary General Touré referred to participation in the IGF as a 
“waste of time.” In fact, he has often indicated that the 192-memberstate “ITU family” 
was a more appropriate forum for many of the looming global issues in cybersecuri-
ty.102 While the EU initially was a strong supporter of the ITU in calling for a better 
“internationalization” of Internet governance, it also welcomed the US decision to 
“free” ICANN103 in 2009, and acknowledged that a significant step had been taken.104 
Recently, a number of EU Member States have been much less active in supporting 
ITU’s ambitions. In a landmark summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, in October 2010, the-
se countries joined the US and other OECD nations in limiting an expansion of the 
ITU’s role in Internet governance.  
National governments have shown a growing interest in Internet governance. What 
was previously described as operating under a “multi-stakeholder model” (including 
governments, private corporations and the civil society) is coming under increased 
pressure from national governments trying to expand their relative importance in the 
domain at the expense of the other stakeholders, according to some academics.105 
The GAC is also trying to upgrade its importance to a body which can influence deci-
sions of the ICANN board. Interestingly, the present US proposal to this mirrors that 
of European delegates 2005, which was blocked by the then US administration. The 
Internet Governance Forum is also attempting to redefine itself as part of the renewal 
of its five-year mandate, a redefinition process governments initially tried to reserve 
for themselves as their own prerogative. But, as the ITU General Meeting showed, 
there is still substantial support for the multi-stakeholder approach, and signs that 
Western OECD nations in particular are joining together to support it. 
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